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If there is one principle that our forefathers, founding
the Constitution, had more at heart than any other, it is per-
sonal liberty,-personal liberty asguaranteed bytheuniversal
right to equal law, the laws made by their own home repre-
sentative bodies, administrated in their own home courts,
anl based on the common law of England; and the common
law of E'ngljand has ever been jealous of all but conilmon law
tribunals, wholly rejects any administrative law peculiar
to the government as is known in continental countries, and
abhors any tribunal, board, or commission, drawing its
authority from the Executive, and which, while not a proper
court of justice, undertakes to settle judicial questions.
To secure all this, the great printiple of the separation
NOT-This article formed the subject of an addrcss delivered by
Mr. Frederic J. Siimion before tWe Society of the Ahtmiji of the Law
Department of the University of Penusylvania at their annual meeting
on'Frday, April ioth, 1908, and is published through his courtesy and
kind permission.
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of the powers of -government was adopted and carried to its
full extent. -In the splendid words of the Massachusetts
Bill of Rights:
"In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative depart-
ment shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either
of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial
powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legis-
lative and- executive powers, or either of them; to the end it may be a
government of laws and not of men."
The cardinal liberties secured by the Bill of Rights are
put forever under the aegis of State legislatures and local
common law courts and their independence from tfle Execu--
tive duly secured. And furthermore, we have the State
autonoiy forever secured by the independent, indestructible
State, as well as by tle separation of the three powers in
both State au'd nation. And of these cardinal rights, no
man may .be deprived but by twelve men of his equals in his
own country, nor,'in criminal causes, be depri,,ed for ofte
day of his personal liberty, but by a finding of twenty-three
of his neighbors that there is-probable cause for holding him
guilty of crime. The totality of all these principles we will
.uinn up in the convenient phrase "local self-government",-
but remembering that this phrase means ztuch more than
administrative government alone.
To'show how strong was this feeling, we will read from
a few of the earliest State const-ituti6ns adopted lhth be-
fore and after the Federal Constitution of 1789; first that of
Pennsylvania. September 28, I776; then in the same year.
that of Ma'rland, November I T, 1776. and North Carolina,
November i8, 1776. and of Vermont, 1777.
"That the people of this State ought to have the sole and exclusive
right of regulating the internal government and police thereof."
In the same year is that of Connecticut:
"This Constitut.cin adopted by the people of this State, shall be and
remain the Civil Constitution of this State, under the sole authority
cif the people thcre.f, idepcndent of any King or Prince whatever. And
that this Republic is, and shall forever be and remain, a free, sover-
eign and independent State, by the name of the Stati of Coifnecticut."
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In 1780, we have the constitution of Massachusetts and
in 1784 that of New Hampshire.
* "The people of this commonwealth have the sole and exclusive right
of governing themselves as a free, sovereign and independent State
and do, and forever hereafter shall, exercise and enjoy every power,
jurisdiction, and right which is not, or may not hereafter be, by them
expressly delegated to the United States of America in Congress assem-
bled."
And for an example of a later constitution, we have
that of West Virginia, in 1872.
"The government of the United States is a government of enum-
erated powers, an4 all powers not delegated to it nor inhibited to the
States are reserved to the States or to the people thereof. Among the
powers so reserved by the States is the exclusive regulation of their
own internal governmcnt and police, and it is the high and solemn duty
of the several departments of governmebt created by this constitution to
guard and protect the people of this State from all encroachments
upon the rigbts so 
reserved."
Solicitude for local courts apart from the centralized
courts even of our own government reaches right back to
Magna Charta.
(Cbapter 17) "Common pleas shall not -ollow the King's Court,
but be held in some certain place."
(Chapter 2o). "Fines to be assessed by honest men of the neighbor-
hood."
"The writ called Praccipe shall not in future be issued, so as to
cause a freemai to lose his court."
So in the Virginia Bill of Rights, he must be tried by a
"jury. -of his vicinage," and the Maryland Constitution of
1776 says:
"That the t rial of facts where they arise is one of the greatest
securities of the lives, liberties and -estates of the people."
And this is repeated in the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights and expressly recoiized in the Federal constitu-
tion. Article 3, Section 2, providing that all trials shall be-
held in the State where the crime is committed and shall be
by a jury; and in the Sixth Amendment the venue is further
limited to the district where the crime is committed; and
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by the Seventh Amendment the- right of trial by jury is
preserved also in civil cases and the Federal power is for-
bidden to retry any cause other than according to the rules
of the common law.
And the separation of the powers is shown expressly in
ten out of the thirteen of the first constitutions of the origi-
nal States and is to-day recognized in every single one of the
States of the Union with the solitary exception of the State
of New York..
But the Englislh principle of local liberty, local parlia-
ments and county courts, and the control by the people at
home of their own affairs, became to the thirteen colonies
far more important; for instead of a small homogeneous
country like England, they had, even in 1776, a country
reaching fiom the sub-Arctic to the torrid zone, from ocean
to prairie, with different climates and different institutions,
made up of five different races, even if we count Scotch and
English and Irish as one, and with at least four mutually
hostile religious faiths; with a social system in the South
as different from that in the North as black from white;
and all the colonies agreeing only on this one thing, to
preserve the cardinal liberties of the Bill of Rights.. How
reconcile these local libertiesi this government by the people
of their* owfi affairs, with that strong yet far off central
government .they were about to create in order to regllate
their foreign. relations and the affairs tat they deemed of*
national concern? Yet the experience of the Revolution
showed that such a government was necessary.
It is a familiar truth that this reconcilement of national
power with local liberty was their great invention; a strong
central government for political, national affairs, working
directly on the'people, not, as in till previous confederations,
on the component States; conjoined with absolute autonomy
as to the making and the judging of laws, and the adminis-
tration of their own affairs at home; 'also the cntrol by the
people of each State of the great money power, of the raising
and expending of practically all the taxes, leaving thenational
govlernment to support itself by indirect taxation only and
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the taxes to be imposed upon foreign commerce. ! have not
time to dwell on this point, which is familiar to all of us; I
hasten to consider the actual division made by the founders
of the American Reptiblic of all sovereign power between
the States and the central government. This is the special
subject, I ask you to reconsider to-day; in a day when all
things, even constitutional principles a thousand years old,
must justify themselves to us anew.
Now if you will draw a sphere to represent the total
domain of sovereign power under a constitutional republic,
you have at once suggested our first distinction. For our
.governments, both State and national, must always remain
repulflican and constitutional. They are not meant, as now
seems to be thought, only to enforce the will of the majority,
but in certain things to protect the minority, as well, and to
guarantee forever free government and private rights.
There is a vast domain of unlimited, sovereign, autocratic,
imperial power, outside of this sphere, that may stand for
those powers of conquest and oppression which are out-
sile a!' ' -v and may be wielded by in oriental dbspot or a
European -eror; but these powers remain outside our'
constitution. Our forefathers intentionally and forever ex-
cluded them, withheld them from any and all governments
they were about to create, Federal, State, or both together.
Undoubtedly the people can set aside this constitution, and
establish, if they like, an empire or an oligarchy; but until
they do so, it is treason in any one to attempt it and a
breach of the oath of every Federal officeholder, judical or
executive.
As the king himself exists but by the law, so the Federal
government is the creature of the Constitution. And'this
after all is really our greatest contribution to the history of
humanity; the American people, forming a great nation, a
sovereign people, forever denying to themselves and their
own government imperial power. limiting it to be repub-
lican in form, their own legislatures to a written constitu-
tion, and both forever by the rights of each free man.
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Now between the central government and the State, how
did they in fact divide the constitutional powers of govern-
ment; these that are represented within this sphere that I have
drawn? Let us first draw a zone A to represent the powers
they granted to the nation and the Federal governments. Let
us now draw a zone B to represent the powers given or re-
served to the States. Where they cross, the segment AB
will exactly represent the powers shared by both-where
State and Federal jurisdiction coincide.
But this is a government not only of delegated but of
limited powers. Large prohibitions were imposed upon the
Federal government. Let us represent these by the zone
X, and draw that farthest away from the zone A where we
have put the powers allowed. And many such prohibitions
were imposed, even in the Federal Constitution, on State
governmerts or legislatures also; let us represent these by
zone Z, farthest from zone B, the zone of the States' Rights.
And in like manner, where those zones of prohibition cross,
we shall have the double prohibition on both State andnation
represented by the segment XZ, those great rights which the
people chose to protect from either govertiment.
Now, lastly, we have a central area left unnamed,
What may be the meaning of this? The answer is obvious.
This is the most important of all; for it. is tiat vast realm of
sovereign power reserved to themselves by the people, virgin
yet. delegated by them neither to the State nor to the nation,
kept in their own hands until such time as, by amendment
to the Constitution, and by amendment only, they, the
people, might choose to give them up. The things belonging
to this area resemble those in the area XZ, the powers for-
bidden to the nation and the States, for powers forbidden
are necessarily reserved; but in Y we will class those powers
which, such as we find in the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments, are by express words reserved to the people or to the
States; the great principles of the Bill of Rights, the right
to law and to equal law, the right to property, the right to
vote their own taxes, those taxes to be for the benefit of all
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and to be ex 'pended by the people who pay them, the right
to a republican form of government, in both State and
nation, to be administered by the people themselves, or by
officers who are their trustees and servants and are elected
by popular suffrage; by an Executive who is not to be left
in power one year without a meeting of the legislative
brand; by an army that may not be maintained two years
without a new vote of Congress; by judges, who, that they
may not be dependent on the Executive, are appointed for
life, and paid a salary that may not be reduced by Con-
gress. These are a few of the principles that remain in the
great central area Y, of which the States and people may
never be deprived.
Now obse -ve-this area we call Y, the central realm of
the people's ights, alone is unlimited and indefinite; for it
represents al the sovereign power in the world, that remaine,
-all that re -ains of all possible power of free government
when you hn:,e granted away the eight .definite subtractions
of these othr zones. Take eight from infinity and infinity
remains. A I other powers are definite, limited, defined;
the people's rowers alone are not.
But coming lastly to our special theme, there are two seg-
ments that I havc not mentioned, AZ and BX. AZ where
the zone of what is forbidden to the States cuts the zone of
what is permitted to the nation; the area of absolute Federal
power given to the nation, and at the same time denied to
the States,-here, under the Constitution, is the realm of
centralization, of imperialism. For what is in the rest of
our zone A expresses powers which are merely pernitted to
the nation, not necessarily denied to the States; and this little
difference between A and AZ isthereforeto beonegreatprob-
lem of American Constitutional law. So, in like manner, in B
simple, we shall find what the States may do and the nation
also; while that part of B which is crossed by X represents
all that is 7vithheld from the Federal Government. Here
therefore is the scope and realm, the home-ground, of what
we call States' Rights. Let us not be prejudiced against
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them because the term is identified in our memories with the
heresy of secession; purged of that fault, we may live to see
that the cry, "States' right," embodies our truest liberties.
Now on these two qualifications hang all the law of our
Constitution. If you can say what is to be AZ, and what
is A; for instance, whether all corporations or industries are
to be solely under Federal control or also under the power
of the States-if you can tell what is to be BX and not B
simply; for instance, whether the rights of property, trade,
taxation are to be solely under the State 6r to be controlled
by the nation-you shall tell me the future of our republic.
The Federal powers are political; that is the great cri-
terion The State powers, on the other hand, are domestic,
social. They relate to the relation between a manu and his
fellow men, to his control over his own property, and to the
trial of his disputes with his neighbors, of his controversies
with all except the Federal Government and of allhis
crimes or offentes except only those which, like treason,
relate directly to his duty to the Federal Government, or are
committed in the places subject to its exclusive jurisdiction,
such as forts, military reservations, national territory not
incorporated into a State, and the high seas. The Federal
Government is a political sovereign; but has almost none
of the attributes of sovereignty for any other purpose. This
broad fact is revealed to us with startling clearness when
we note that it has generally neither the power of capital
punishment nor, in effect, of direct taxation. It would be
hard to find two more necessary attributes of sovereignty as
commonly understood in the science of government, than
the power over life and the power over property. More-
over, except for special ptirposes of national defense, etc.,
it cannot hold any land. Even its political power is far less
than is commonly enjoyed by sovereign nations; it cannot,
for instance, cede territory from any State. Moreover, our
national sovereign is controlled by the most fundamental
of all limitations. It may not, tinder the Constitution,
that is to say, without going back to the people, which it rec-
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ognizes as the only soarce of power--change its form from
a republican form of government not even to a pure democ-
racy. It is even possible, under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, that it may not adopt -a system of socialism or
communism, or permit a State so to do.
To see how completely this division between what is
political and what is social, domestic, or relating to private
right is carried out in the Federal Constitution, it will repay
us to run over its provisions in some detail. The Preamble
relates both to social and political objects, such as the com-
mon defense, but lays down at the beginning the great prin-
ciple that it is the people and not the States who made the
nation and the constitution. The first two- sections of Ar-
ticle I relating to Congress are political. Section 3 forbids
all direct taxes; that is, all taxes directly imposed upon prop-
erty or individuals, except they be apportioncd to the States
according to their population and not according to their
wealth. This not only is, but was intended io be, in effect a
prohibition to the Federal Governme.nt of the powerof direct
taxation. All the rest of the first seven sections are also
political; relating generally to the organization, election and
liberties of the Congress, and the method of legislation.
Section 8 Of Article I *contains almost the only powers given
to the Federal Government which may, under our division,
be called social; and while no one would desire to change
the Constitution in this particular, it is highly significant that
this exception has given rise to most of the litigation, most
of the discussion, and to the leading division between the
two great political parties today. That is to say, while the
object of the Federal Government is to protect the nation
from attack and manage its foreign affairs and impose
taxes therefor "for the common defense and general wel-
fare of the United States", the lesson of the existence of the
thirteen St'ates under the Confederation showed that they
coul not be trusted with the regulation of commerce passing
from or to other States crossing their borders. This, there-
fore, was denied to the States, and necessarily left to the
Federal power; dbubtless, however, rather with the intention
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of preventing the States from interfering with such com-
merce than allowing the Federal Governmerit to do so.
Then, Congress is abthorized to make a uniform bankruptcy
law throughout the United States; the only matter in which
the necessary advisability of uniform laws was recognized
in the Constitution and expressly given to the Federal Gov-
ernment; and the power to establish post offices and post
roads and issue national patents and copyrights, being a
usual national power, is hardly an exception to our rule.
Yet these matters, until we come to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, are the only suhjects in which the Constitution clothes
the Federal Government with any power relating to the
citizen's individual affairs and his private business.
Phut even the political powers are not broadly given. The
eight clauses of Section 9 in the first article consist entirely
of negations; and there are many others. On the other hand,
the entire sovereignty of the-State over individual relations,
social. and domestic affairs, and property rights is shown
by the very few restrictions and exceptions we can find in
the Federal Constitution. And these exceptions are purely
political.
National political powers, as well as powers of taxation,
or relating to interstate or foreign trade, are, of course, for-
hidden to the States. Article II relates entirely to the
Federal executive power and is entirely political; Article III
to the Federal judicial power; and here the only timewhen
the national courts may be invoked other than to interpret
and define the Federal Constitution and laws is to guarantee
a fair trial in an impartial tribunal between citizens of dif-
ferent States. Article IV, Section 2, does indeed, provide
that a citizen of one State shall have all the social and con-
tractual rights that aregiven inany other State to the citizens
thereof; but this can hardly be said to give the Federal
Government any power over social 'matters; rather it merely
guarantees the right tolaw in each Stateto all citizens of other
States, much as the Fourteenth Amendment later does to
all citizens of the United States, and even as Henry II guar-
anteed it to all free men of England. Over the territories in-
LATIVE P0WER BETWEEN CONGRESS AND STATES 371
deed, Congress is expressly given full power, social and do-
mestic as well as political; but it is only of late years that it
has generally exercised it in any other way than to erect ter-
ritorial legislatures; and in the older territories, at least,
there is no meddling with individual rights.
The first eleven amendments are all restrictions; that is to
say, they are at great pains expressly to Withhold all social
and domestic affairs, or cardinal liberty rights, from the
Federal Government, and even some that are political; the
first ten, therefore, showing a strong reaction in favor of the
rights of the States and the liberties of the people, in 1791,
.while the eleventh Amendment was a still more decisive step
in that direction, withholding all Federal judicial power
where a State was directly concerned; much as James I en-
deavored, through vainly, to get Chief Justice Coke to rule
that he would not consider a case where the interests of the
King were involvedl. The Thirteenth Amendment is strik-
ing ini that it is the only instance where the Constitution is
expressly extended to any place subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States, and where, as it has recently been put,
"The Constitution follows the flag". Slavery, therefore,
can exist nowhere, not even in the Sulu Islands; although
even the other cardinal requirement, a republican form of
government, may constitutionally be withheld from them as
from the other territories.
The modern reaction in favor of the Federal power is
shown first in the Fourteenth Amendment proclaimed July
29th, 186, though the interpretation which might have rev-
olutionized the whole State and Federal system has substan-
tialy been denied by the Supreme Court. The Amendment
does, however, and for the first time, interfere between the
State and the indi ,idual, if not between the individual and
his neighbors. The State is forbidden to deprive any person
of life. liberty or property without due process of law, or
to deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws, and this directly by the Federal Govern-
ment. The radical upholders of centralization, in recon-
struction times, undoubtedly believed that this brought the
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hand of the Federal Government between a man and his
neighbors and indeed all his private affairs; otherwise it
would be surprising that it took nearly twenty years of
great decisions by the Supreme Court to read the amend-
ment in strict accordance with its simple words-that it ap-
I;Iied only to a State and to due process of law of a State;
that it did not, as had been done in early times after the
Conquest, give the Norman Court, the centralized govern-
ment, jurisdiction of all matters and causes.on the mere plea
of Englishry, or that a Norman was concerned. As it has
therefore worked out, it is merely a new national guarantee,
like that securing a republican form of government, of the
cardinal liberty and property rig-ts against law-making by
the States; and it does not, Wnder the plea that a person is
being tiifairly treated by a neighbor or an officiai, drag all
matters of ordinary trade and private right into the Federal
courts.
Whether the extreme interpretation of the interstate com-
merce clause now proposed will carry us to this length it is
too early now to say; nor, indeed, is this acontroversialessay.
That there has been for some years a decided trend in that
direction, one must admit. The history of the ih'terpreta-
tion by the courts and by Congress of the words "regulate
commerce among the several States" has been to extend
the neaning of commerce fromp the things transported, the
physical instrumentalities of interstate commerce, the neces-
sary documents concerning it, to the corporations and per-
sons conducting it, the conditions of their labor and the rates
they may charge-this by the year 19j8-and of the words
"among the several States" from the natural physical trans-
portation across State lines to a combination or contractmade
in one or more States intended to act in others or in effect
carried out in others.
It is perhaps obviis that we intend to vithhold the right
of conducting interstate commerce from any corporation
not conforming to a Federal standard. Whether we shall
go further and deny it to individuals; whether, indeed,
Congress has the constitutional right to deny it to indi-
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viduals; and whether, on the otherbranchof the definition,we
shall extend it from commerce, in the sense of interstate traf-
fic, to manufacturing, mining, or producing goods intended
to be sold outside of the State where they are manufactured,
mined or produced; and to the returns, or the profits, or the
fortunes, or the disposition of the fortunes, derived there-
from; and still more, to the contractual relations, the condi-
tions of labor, etc., of the persons so engaged,-are all
matters for the future to settle.
The power of suspending laws or their application, or
agreeing not to prosecute in certain cases or to pardon cer-
tain offenders, is a dangerous one in the hands of the. Ex-
ecutive. Moreover, there is an increasing tendency today
in Congress to grant legislative power to the Executive or to
boards or commissions of his appointment. Notably has this
been done in recent years in the case of making treaties,
fixing customs duties, the rates of railways, and in the con-
trol of corporations,-all properly legislative matters. The
excuse made is that Congress declares the general principle
and the act of the President, for instance, in finding a state
of affairs to exist upon which he may ratify a treaty or pro-
claim a comi.iercial arrangement, is merely ministerial. An
example of the length to which this theory may be carried
is found in the recent railway regulation act or Hepburn
Bill, where Congress merely proclaims that the rates shall
be reasonable aind without discrimination,--both mere ex-
pressions of the common law,-and leaves the determination
of what is reasonable between the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the Supreme Court, neither of them legis-
lative bodies. The common law may, indeed, be decided by
a judicial body; but it is difficult to see why the alteration of
the common law is not legislation. Wien, therefore, the
commission fix a "just and reasonable" rate,' if they are
applying the common law, their act is judiciai; if they are
fixing other standards, it is legislative. Federal judges have
'U..S. Act of February 4,'1887, as amended June 29, go6, Section i5.
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consistently, from the beginning, refused to exercise other
than judicial functions.
The leading modern English.historian ends a long account
of the attempted centralization of English administration
under the Norman kings with theboast that fromthat timeon
until now there is no body of ten thousand English speaking
men in the world, which is not governed by the laws that
they make themselves.
I believe that the constitutional decisions of the next ten
years will prove the most important in the history of our
own republic. It is peculiarly the duty of those of our pro-
fession to point out the dangers that beset the path upon
which the people may wish to go. Legislation is now pend-.
ingin Congress which seems to me to be more radical, more
un-English than anything that has been enacted in an Eng-
lish speaking legislature for many centuries. It has been the
proud boast of the great statesmen and lawyers of England
that we have no administrative law, no law peculiar to the
government or administered by government officials, but
that every officer, civil" or military, must answer for his
acts in the common law courts, and that every individual or
association of individuals has the right to have their legality
tried-there, and tried there alone. To submit the judgment
of the great right of freedom of contract and association to.
the judgment of an administrative official would be well on
the road to the introduction of the whole European system
of administrative law and government by bureaucracy.
When a man is responsible for his acts or contracts not to
legislatures or courts and juries, but to executive officers;
you cease to be American and become European, if not
Oriental. and when you give up your care for local self-
g,w ernment and your home courts and juries, you are not
far from the state of the kingdom of Italy or the Empire
of Russia. where a mighty central government stretches its
paralying hand between the laborer and his daily bread, the
merdiant and his trade, the citizen and his vote.
F. I. Stimson.
